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Middle Eastern Women between Oppression and Resistance:
Case Studies of Iraqi, Palestinian and Kurdish Women of Turkey
By Yasmin Khodary 1, Noha Salah, Nada Mohsen

Abstract
Wars and conflicts have had a profound impact on women and gender in the Middle East.
In this article, we aim to highlight the various ways in which the ongoing oppression and conflict
in the Middle East shape the responses of the Iraqi, Palestinian and Kurdish women of Turkey
and the object of their struggles. We go beyond the ‘Orientalist’ discourse, which depicts Middle
Eastern women in armed conflicts as solely vulnerable and helpless victims, to discuss the
resisting roles played by the Iraqi, Palestinian and Kurdish women of Turkey. Middle Eastern
women have played and continue to play major roles in responding to society, gender and state
oppression. While the Iraqi women in this study voice their resistance through conventional
actions and wide civil-society activism that transcends the local level, the Palestinian women
engage in unconventional unarmed or peaceful resistance through Sumud and cultural resistance
as well as armed/non-peaceful acts of resistance. Finally, in the face of Turkish state oppression,
the Kurdish women of Turkey also deploy non-peaceful resistance through becoming active
fighters and engaging leadership positions in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party.
Keywords: Iraqi Women, Palestinian Women, Kurdish Women, Resilience, Resistance,
Oppression.

Introduction
Wars and conflicts have had a profound impact on women and gender in the Middle East.
In Yemen, Libya and Syria, the civil wars and the displacement that followed there have, on the
whole, affected women negatively. The emergence of the Islamic State (IS) has also led to massive
waves of enslavement and the rape of women and young girls, particularly in Iraq and Syria.
According to Tharoor (2016), after the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, the life expectancy for women
decreased from 85 years to 66 years in Yemen and from 85 years to 75 years in Syria. In addition,
“traditional” gender relations have been emphasized and women (mis)used as symbols to secure
sectarian and national collective identities (Al-Ali and Pratt 2009). The intersectionality and
interplay between gender and other identities also intensified the impact wars and conflict had on
particular women groups, such as the female Arab population in Israel and the Kurdish women of
Turkey, compared to the rest of the population (Na’amnih et al. 2010).
In this article, we aim, first, to highlight the ongoing oppression and conflict in the Middle
East and, second, to explore the various ways in which such oppression shape the responses of
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Iraqi, Palestinian and Kurdish women of Turkey and the object of their struggles. 2 We go beyond
the ‘Orientalist’ discourse, which depicts Middle Eastern women in armed conflicts primarily as
vulnerable and helpless victims, to discuss the resisting roles played by the Iraqi, Palestinian and
Kurdish women (in Turkey) 3. On the contrary to this one-sided and static ‘victimization’ discourse,
we present oppression and conflict as factors that stimulate women, in various and more dynamic
ways, to react to the causes of oppression. Katerina Dalacoura (2019) encapsulates this thinking
when she observes that, “wars and conflicts in the MENA region have clearly affected women and
gender relations, but the reverse is also true.”
Middle Eastern women have played and continue to play major roles in responding to
oppression by society or formal state organizations and systems. Following Dudouet’s
classification of responses to oppression, we find that, while the Iraqi women voice their resistance
through conventional actions and wide civil-society activism that transcends the national level, the
Palestinian women engage in unconventional unarmed or peaceful resistance through Sumud and
cultural resistance as well as acts of armed/non-peaceful resistance. In the face of Turkish state
oppression, the Kurdish women of Turkey also deploy non-peaceful resistance strategies either
through becoming active fighters in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or engaging in leadership
positions.
In exploring the various types of oppression which these Iraqi, Palestinian and Kurdish
women endure and the major forms of resistance they employ, we utilize a qualitative methodology
to collect and analyze our data. We rely on in-depth interviews carried out over the course of 18
months with experts and women involved in resistance, such as Amal Kabashi, the member of the
Municipal Council of Sadr City, Hala Al-Sarraf, the director of the Iraq Health Access
Organization, Aseel Al-Rubaei, a member in the Association of Iraqi Women, Amnaa Muhammed,
the head of the Legal Department in the Iraqi Ministry of Justice and Social Affairs, Abla AlDajani the head of the General Union of Palestinian Women and Mohamed Gomaa’, an expert in
Kurdish affairs 4.
The article is divided into four sections. It begins by briefly situating the subject of this
study within the wider debate on Middle Eastern women in the zones of conflict and violence.
Then, in the following three sections, we illustrate the various ways in which oppression generates
2

This study comes within the framework of a broader project supported by the Young Investigator Research Grant
at the British University in Egypt. The project aims to study women’s major forms of resistance to oppression and
inequalities in the Middle East. Having endured not only internal but also external forms of oppression, which lasted
for long periods of time, Iraqi, Palestinian and Kurdish women were selected as the focus of this study. For decades,
Iraqi women were exposed to regional and international wars in addition to state oppression, whereas Palestinian
women continues to endure daily and systemic oppression from the Israeli occupation and Kurdish women are
exposed to external repression from the Turkish government. Having endured long periods of oppression, we expect
the forms of resistance they deploy to be much more concrete and visible.
3
We realize that Iraqi, Palestinian or Kurdish women are different in terms of ethnic background, social class, place
of residence (urban or rural), religious and political orientation, specific experiences of oppression and that any
tendency to present either them as homogeneous entities will be ignoring such differences. However, for research
purposes, we will continue to use the terms ‘Iraqi women’, ‘Palestinian women’ and ‘Kurdish women.’
4
The interviewees were identified and approached after an extensive research about Iraqi, Palestinian and Kurdish
female activists and experts. This has been followed by ‘snowballing’ to identify and reach further relevant female
activists. The overall interviewing process took 18 months with an aim of getting a sense of women’s experiences
with oppression and their responses or resistance. Both interviewees Abla Al-Dajani, the head of the General Union
of Palestinian Women, and Mohamed Gomaa’, the expert in Kurdish affairs, were interviewed through face-to-face
semi-structured interviews in Cairo, Egypt. Except for Al-Dajani and Gomaa’, the rest of the interviewees were
approached through web-based interviews which included open-ended flexible questions giving the interviewees
sufficient space to express their experiences with oppression and resistance.
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and shapes the nature of the Iraqi, Palestinian and Kurdish women’s resistance and the object of
their struggles. In each section, we explain the oppression they endure because of the society or
state organizations and systems. Then, in light of the peculiarities of their contexts, we explain
their agency and the different forms of resistance they deploy.

Middle-Eastern Women in Conflict
There is a general tendency to portray Middle Eastern women as inferior and imprisoned
by their traditions and cultures in comparison to Western women who are often depicted as
possessing a superior and liberated status. This lack of accurate analytical perspective, particularly
about the Middle Eastern women during the nineteenth century, is largely due to the limited
visibility of literature that presents any different experiences of Middle Eastern women (Afshar,
2016; Meriwether, 2018). Meriwether and Tucker (1999) explain the false depiction of Middle
Eastern women as veiled and oppressed victims of a misogynistic religion, regardless of any
change over time or space, with reference to Orientalism and the Western construction of ‘the
Orient’ for purposes not only of self-definition but also for control and exploitation. This
inaccurate perspective on Middle Eastern women and gender serves to guide and justify policies
and actions of the ‘West’, including, for instance, the U.S led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Khalili,
2010).
As a result of this trend, scholars such as Sedghi (1994), Babiker (1999), Sharoni (2001),
Cockburn (2002) and Mazurana, (2013) challenge the dominant narrative by exploring the role
Middle Easter women have played in resisting oppression. Within the domains of feminism,
conflict theories, resistance theories, or social movements, these scholars have explored the
multifaceted and often reinforcing relationship between oppression and conflicts, on the one hand,
and women’s agency, activism and resistance, on the other hand. Sedghi (1994), for example,
employs “Third World Feminist” theory to highlight the range of responses by Middle Eastern
women to domination and oppression. These responses are specific to both time and place. For
example, many Middle Eastern women movements have merged with or emerged from nationalist
local resistance movements to colonial and imperial domination in countries like Egypt, Algeria
and Palestine (Sedghi, 1994). In the wars fought for liberation, women have played active roles by
resorting either to peaceful means (e.g. by joining civil society movements) or to non-peaceful and
militant means (e.g. by becoming combatants in conflict) (Mazurana, 2013). Some of these
movements, especially in Egypt and Iran during the twentieth century, evolved to include
progressive demands related to women’s rights, either under claims of secularization or
Islamization (Hoodfar, 1999; Sika and Khodary, 2012). Other movements, for example in South
Yemen, have remained anti-imperialist and are less gender oriented. In Sudan, as well, women
have played violent and revenge-related roles (Sedghi, 1994).
Clearly, in armed conflicts and post-conflict contexts, one needs to go beyond the
orientalist lens that perceives women as mere victims or confines them within their traditional roles
(Sharoni, 2001). Middle Eastern women are fighting a different fight to Western feminists. Their
resistance is divided against various forms of domination and oppression. Hence, as reiterated by
George-Williams (2005) and Hudson (2006), a more context-specific depiction of women and
men’s roles must be embraced to take into consideration the relevant socio-cultural, economic and
political surroundings. Holt and Jawad (2013) employ, for instance, Scott’s concept of ‘everyday
resistance’ to explain the narratives of the women in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon,
Palestine and Iraq. James Scott introduced his concept of ‘Everyday Resistance’ in 1985; by doing
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so, he opened the way for conceptualizing different strategies of resistance, including the use of
culture as a tool of resistance (Vinthagen and Johansson, 2013). Holt and Jawad also argue that
the narratives of many Middle Eastern women carry a different meaning to resistance that go
beyond the “politics of piety” normally assigned to them. Their forms of resistance occasionally
interact with existing religious identities in a positive, negative or more complex manner. Tripp
(2013) similarly discusses the many paths of resistance which Middle Eastern communities, in
general, and women, in particular, employ. This includes violent, nonviolent, imaginative,
economic and symbolic resistance, on the one hand, and the politics of violence and oppression
that generate them, on the other hand. For instance, the violent shifts in power brought by the USled invasion on Iraq in 2003 and the Israeli military occupation of ‘all of historical Palestine in
1967’ provoked violent resistance by both Iraqi and Palestinian women (Tripp, 2013). Hence, it is
crucial to explore the variety among the contrasting forms of resistance which Middle Eastern
women deploy within the context of oppression.
To gain a more comprehensive and analytical image of Middle Eastern women’s realities,
the contexts of oppression, victimization, violence or exclusion have to be depicted together with
women’s (in)existing responses to their contexts. According to Foucault and Gordon (1980),
resistance occurs when power is exercised for the sake of oppressing and repressing others.
Resistance, hence, is inseparable from oppression by the powerful or dominant group which
possesses more power and access to resources. Different forms and degrees of oppression are
capable of triggering a wide of array and degrees of resistance (Siljak, 2014). Resistance in this
sense can be exercised by individuals and groups against a wide array of tangible and non-tangible
forms of oppression, including material, status and ideological forms of domination (Scott, 1985).
Resistance can also be exercised against oppression by social institutions, organizations and state
systems (e.g., government, media, education, religion and criminal justice system), which is called
‘institutional oppression’ (DiAngelo and Sensoy, 2012). In the later, the policies, laws, norms,
rules and values governing the social institutions and state systems systematically benefit some
groups over others, creating and perpetuating systems of disadvantage based on social identity and
group membership.
Véronique Dudouet (2015) refers to a continuum of responses to oppression. This includes
dynamic responses that can be employed, combined or changed depending on the time, space and
type of oppression. The continuum includes two main analytical categories. The first category
involves conventional actions, such as party politics, advocacy, dialogue, diplomacy, negotiations
and litigation. This category builds on McCarthy’s first three classifications of possible responses
to oppression: non-conflictual responses or avoidance; conflict resolution through for example
dialogue and negotiation; and institutional responses through legislation, legal action and lobbying.
Dudouet’s second category is contentious/non-conventional actions. Unlike Dudouet’s first
category of conventional actions, the second category, operates outside the bounds of conventional
political channels. It includes two sub-categories: a) nonviolent and peaceful resistance through
protest and persuasion, non-cooperation, disruptive intervention and creative resistance; and b)
violent resistance, which inflicts physical damage to persons or property, through warfare,
insurgency, terrorist attacks, guerrilla wars, violent protest and sabotage (Dudouet, 2013). As we
shall see, while the Iraqi women voice their resistance through conventional actions and wide civilsociety activism that transcend the local level, the Palestinian women, on the other hand, engage
in unconventional unarmed or peaceful resistance through Sumud and cultural resistance as well
as armed/non-peaceful resistance. In the face of Turkish state oppression, Kurdish women also
deploy non-peaceful resistance through becoming active fighters in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
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(PKK). However, portraying Middle Eastern women as always resistant also provides an
incomplete image of these women’s realities. Hence, it is important not to impose our assumptions
about women’s behaviors or specific roles as these factors change from one context to another
depending on the socio-cultural, political, security conditions. Bearing this in mind, the following
sections of the article analyze the interplay between women’s surrounding contexts and their
experiences of oppression and marginalization, on the one hand, and their (in)existing responses
to these situations, on the other hand.

Iraqi Women in the Face of State and Society Oppression
Traditionally stereotyped depictions of Iraqi women inside the family or as ‘peace-makers’
are still prevalent even among Iraqi women themselves and even among female Iraqi scholars. In
an interview with Amnaa Muhammed, the head of the Legal Department in the Iraqi Ministry of
Justice and Social Affairs, she asserts that,
Maintaining and making peace is associated with the nature of women. The fact
that women give life makes them realize the value of life. Hence, the supposed role
of women in making peace in the world. Peace starts from home through the way
of dealing with family members based on the adoption of dialogue and the
prevention of any form of violence. Women, with their moral and deterrent nature,
have special abilities to contribute to peacekeeping. They are also one of the main
victims of war.
However, delimiting the presence of Iraqi women in the political scene to the stereotyped
roles of women depicts an incomplete and inaccurate picture of the roles Iraqi women play in
reality and de-contextualizes their experience. Early signs of Iraqi women’s resistance to state
oppression manifested in 1923, when Neamat Hamoudah, Asmaa Elzahawy, Paulina Hassoun,
Hasiba Gaafar, Okailat Elhaidary and others called for a greater role for women in the public space.
This call resulted in the emergence of women journalism (e.g Layla Journal) and a number of
females led nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including the associations for the Protection
of Children, the Houses of the Nation, and the Arab House (The Arab Women Pioneers Network,
2012). In the 1940s, Iraqi women expressed their resistance to Fascism and Nazism through
establishing the Anti-Fascism Feminist committee and the Anti- Fascism and Nazism Iraqi Woman
Association, which was founded by Afifa Raouf assisted by Naziha Eldelimy, Rose Khadoury,
Viktoria Noaman, Afifa Elbostany, Amina Elrahal, Saadeya Elrahal and Nazima Wahby. The Iraqi
women also played a significant role in resisting British colonization and in weakening the 1948
Portsmouth treaty between Iraq and United Kingdom by engaging in a series of demonstrations led once by Adaweya Elfalaky- enduring wide arrests and violence (Ibid).
In more recent times, Iraqi women have responded to different forms of oppression
inflicted upon them through peaceful activism, as well as non-peaceful acts of resistance. To better
understand Iraqi women’s activism and resistance, it is important to highlight the forms of
oppression inflicted upon them by the society and state institutions. Oppression under the Baath
regime accompanied by three decades of wars and more than a decade of economic sanctions led
major deteriorations in the economic and social conditions in Iraq, which severely impacted
women. According to Lasky (2006), women who related to male opposition activists or who were
deemed to be of Iranian descent were exposed to rape and sex trafficking or expelled out of the
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country. Ismael (2014) asserts that the Iran–Iraq war (1980-1988) pushed women towards more
segregated work opportunities in the lower strata, unlike the situation in the West during World
War II, where women came to fill many of the previously male-segregated jobs. In addition,
between 1991 and 2003, the international economic sanctions were placed on Iraq after Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait, including forbidding the exporting of oil (for the first five years), freezing the
government and personal accounts abroad, forbidding foreign direct investment, and blocking the
overhaul of industry leading to serious humanitarian consequences (Von Sponeck, 2005). With 13
years of economic sanctions imposed on Iraq ad, additional burdens were placed on women due
to the deteriorating health care, lack of food and basic needs (Lasky, 2013). Some families in
centered and southern Iraq had to force their daughters into early marriage to avoid their additional
expenses, which made the average age of marriage in these regions drop to only ten years old
(NGO’s Coalition of CEDAW Shadow Report, 2014).
At the same time, Iraqi women were subjected to religious extremism and societal
oppression. According to Lasky (2006), “Iraqi women’s legal rights and social and economic
position teetered in an uneasy relationship with tradition: the overarching importance of the
traditional patriarchal family, extremist religious ideologies and norms of family “honor” and
reputation.” Women’s situation was worsened with Saddam Hussein’s search for loyalty from
conservative Sunni religious groups and tribal leaders on the expense of women’s rights and
freedoms. The intersectionality between gender and socio-demographic characteristics also played
a role in marginalizing particular Iraqi women groups more than others. For example, the impact
of religious and patriarchal values was greater on rural and poor Iraqi women compared to secular,
rich and urban ones (Lasky, 2006).
The fall of the Baath regime, however, by U.S forces, which the interviewee Al Saraaf and
107 Iraqi women’s organizations in the 2014 CEDAW Shadow Report continued to label as the
‘Occupation Forces’, did not necessarily signify the end of oppression (NGO’s Coalition of
CEDAW Shadow Report, 2014). To the contrary, in an interview with Amal Al Kabashi, the Vice
President of Women for Progress Center and the member of Sadr City Municipal Council, the
latter highlighted that the participation of Iraqi women in the political process post 2003 had
encountered various political and socio-cultural barriers. In 2006, women were excluded from the
membership of the National Reconciliation Committee which was mandated to ensure the rule of
law, to combat violence and to spread ‘social peace’ and values of tolerance and coexistence.
Women were granted a small bureau in the committee with no concrete duties, responsibilities or
powers. On the contrary, the bureau’s roles were merely ceremonial and consolidated the
traditional stereotyped role of women. Rather than challenging these stereotypes, the committee
only perpetuated and reproduced the patriarchal culture and institutions. As a result, the 2014 Civil
Society Monitoring Report on the UNSCR 1325 revealed a deterioration in the percentage of Iraqi
women involved in peace negotiating teams and the breakdown of gender issues addressed in the
peace agreements (Cabrera-Balleza, M. 2014). The Iraqi women’s exposure to such
marginalization by the state organizations and systems denoted a clear lack of political will to
mainstream gender in the reconciliation efforts and post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq.
Remarkably, the Iraqi activists we interviewed identified the adoption and later application
of a woman's quota in the Iraq as another manifestation of the oppression and marginalization
which they endured since the 2003 invasion. Since 2005, with an aim of ensuring equal rights for
women and men in representation and participation in political life, a quota of 25 percent of the
parliament’s seats was allocated to women (Khodary, 2016). However, in an interview with Hala
Al-Sarraf, the director of the Iraq Health Access Organization, she highlighted that many Iraqi
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activists who supported the quota and pushed for it were unable themselves to engage in the
political process by running for candidacy or even by voting because of security conditions.
According to Amnaa Muhammed, “in the context of Iraq, the representation and participation of
women remains challenging because of the security situation and the increase in sectarian strife
and religious extremism.” As emphasized also by Kabashi during the interview, the deterioration
in the levels of safety and security in Iraq led to lower representation for women in the cabinet and
public institutions and their presence have been limited to the Iraqi parliament and local
governments, which had to set a quota for women by law. As a result, in their 2014 Civil Society
Monitoring Report, the Iraqi women’s organizations highlighted the impact of continuously
deteriorating security situations on the aggravation of the already pre-existing challenges related
to women and peace and security (Cabrera-Balleza, M. 2014).
Many Iraqi activists who supported and advocated for the quota were restrained also due
to party mobilization and male domination in society and politics. In an interview with Aseel Al
Rubaei, a member in the Association of Iraqi Women, the Iraqi International Law Bureau and the
Association for the Defense of Human Right, she explained that Iraqi women suffer from a
restricted role within Iraqi society. This restriction occurs at the hands of both women and men of
the society. Al Rubaei further explained that “because the Iraqi society remains a tribal and male
dominated society, we find that the roles of women and the way to accomplish them are portrayed
and subsequently limited, by such socio-cultural parameters.” According to Amnaa Muhammed,
“women who wish to participate actively in formal peace negotiations should be named by their
male political counterparts.” Most of the women who were able to secure parliamentary positions
represent traditional conservative parties that do not advocate women’s rights or uphold women’s
roles in policy and decision-making. They were also chosen because of their family and social ties
to certain politicians within the parties (Cabrera-Balleza, M. 2014). Eventually, the political scene
was dominated by coalitions associated with ‘the occupiers’ and male-dominated political parties.
Accordingly, the woman’s quota in Iraq was used to serve strategic interests and to secure seats
for male-dominated political parties. As highlighted during the interview with Al-Sarraf,
The quota is, indeed, a proper affirmative action but for informed societies that are
capable of securing a seat for the most competitive women. However, in a society
where education has been on hold for more than two decades, the quota can lead to
the fall of power into the wrong hands.
Eventually, only 22 Iraqi female candidates obtained the votes necessary to win seats in
the 2014 election parliament, while 61 women were allocated seats to fill the quota (The
Economist, 2018). In addition, whereas women occupied 25 percent of the Parliament and
Provincial Councils in 2014, as per the quota, they occupied only 3 percent of the Iraqi cabinet,
5.6 percent of the judiciary, 0.7 percent of the military, 1.4 percent of the police and 0 percent as
governors and deputy governors (Cabrera-Balleza, M. 2014). Women’s roles in Iraqi political life
was restricted due to societal barriers and lack of political will. This perhaps resulted in the reversal
of the impact of the woman’s quota. It also denoted the continuation of the Iraqi women’s
oppression within the political sphere.
A comparable example occurred when the Iraqi Government’s refrained from applying the
2013 National Strategy to Combat Violence against Women and the 2014 National Action Plan
(NAP) on the UNSCR 1325, among other national gender policies. The Security Council
Resolution (SCR) 1325 stresses the importance of women’s equal participation and inclusion in
210
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 21, No. 1 February 2020

national, regional and international levels of decision-making and in peace and security efforts
(including conflict prevention and resolution, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, peacekeeping,
humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction) (UN Security Council, 2000). Despite
budget of $36 million being allocated to implement the NAP on the UNSCR 1325, the relevant
ministries of Justice, Interior, Education, Social Affairs and the Ministry of State for Women’s
Affairs did not receive any of the allocated funds (Cabrera-Balleza, M. 2014). Furthermore, under
the newly approved Family Statutes Law, women were deprived from equal treatment in marriage,
divorce, inheritance or custody. According to new Family Statutes Law, religious and tribal leaders
were given the power to regulate family affairs in their provinces according to their own
interpretations of Sharia (Salbi, 2013). According to Zainab Salbi, “this does not only make women
more vulnerable, but it also gives women from various sects (Sunni or Shi'a) or religions (Muslim
or Christian) different legal treatments on the same issues.”
With the rise in sectarian violence and the seizing of many Iraqi cities by the so-called
‘Islamic State’ (IS), Iraqi women’s situation witnessed further deterioration. This involved the
abduction of Iraqi women and their rape or forced marriage through the dubious logic of ‘Jihad alNikah.’ Yazidi women, in particular, faced unprecedented levels of killing, rape and sexual slavery
Dalacoura (2019). Female Iraqi survivors were frequently blamed for crimes committed against
them, which exposed them to more domestic violence, forced marriage and attempted "honor"
killings. They were also exposed to similar treatments by state institutions, such as the police and
law enforcement and judiciary systems (Cabrera-Balleza, M. 2014). As a result, reported incidents
of child marriage, honor crimes, beatings, torture, rape, trafficking and sexual harassment
increased to 3426 incidents in 2014 compared to 2485 in 2010. As noted by Davis (2016), “while
all Iraqis face insecurity caused by terrorism and civil strife, women and girls experience
additional, targeted abuse because of their gender […] pre-existing impunity and social stigma
surrounding gender-based violence worsens armed conflict's impacts.” The armed conflict and
violence accompanied by the culture of stigma, silence and tendency to solve such issues through
customary laws and within family have all contributed to the deterioration of women’s security
and safety as well as the impunity of perpetrators (Cabrera-Balleza, M. 2014). In this sense, deeplyrooted cultural notions of honor and shame continue to dominate the responses of both public and
state institutions.
In 2018, the Iraqi elections were held in an atmosphere that was optimistic to change,
especially with regards to the situation of Iraqi women. The 2018 elections, however, revealed that
pre-existing threats to Iraqi women remains ongoing at the levels of both state and wider society.
During the elections, photos of female candidates were frequently cut or mutilated. According to
the Iraqi news’ platforms “Lift up your voice”, the female candidates themselves were repeatedly
harassed and attacked with honor-related accusations. Such accusations did not only reduce their
chances of winning or even occupying decedent positions in the future, but they were also
destructive to the reputation of the female candidates. They even provoked honor crimes to protect
the so-called ‘Sharaf al a’sheera’ or the ‘kin’s honor’ (Yousif, 2018).
The oppression which Iraqi women have experienced over the years -by society, imperial
power and state organizations and systems- has resulted in various responses on the side of women.
Despite suffering displacement, rape, violence and death, the International Committee of the Red
Cross notes that “Iraqi women continue to show remarkable resilience and courage in the face of
adversity” (ICRC, 2018). In 2005, 80 women’s organizations representing different regional and
ideological perspectives formed the ‘Iraqi Women Network’ with the aim of “achieving social
justice, influencing public policies and social practices to eliminate all forms of gender
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discrimination and ensuring woman’s participation in political life” (Iraqi Women Network, 2006).
Al Sarraf explained that many women’s organizations took the path of law to defend rights of the
vulnerable, while others worked at the humanitarian level to address widowhood, displacement
and lack of economic opportunities. The Iraqi women’s organizations aimed to ease the suffering
by assisting the groups most affected by the conflict situations, especially women and children. Al
Sarraf referred, for example, to the Health Access Organization, which was established by three
women and has been working in conflict zones for the last 10 years to ease the suffering of
vulnerable Iraqi groups in conflict areas of their country.
In the interview with Kabashi, she pointed to another initiative by seven Iraqi women
NGOs 5 to develop a National Action Plan (NAP) in 2012 to implement UNSCR 1325 6. The plan,
later adopted officially by the Iraqi government in February 2014, was based on a number of aims.
One very important aim was to boost women's participation in negotiations and decision-making.
Another important aim was to protect and assist Iraqi women post-conflict by improving their
living conditions and ensuring a legal environment within which equality is promoted in
compliance with international law. This way, Al Sarraf reiterates, “Women did shape our stand as
those were mainly female activists who represented Iraq.” As described by 107 Iraqi women’s
organizations in the 2014 NGO’s Coalition of CEDAW Shadow Report, the presence of clear and
strong local NGOs in Iraq after 2003 is a ‘reality.’
Iraqi women did not, however, voice their resistance through civil-society activism on the
national level only, but also through international advocacy and lobbying on the international level.
In 2014 and 2015, Iraqi women began to resist governmental oppression and lack of political will
in more explicit ways by taking their battle to the national and international levels. The Iraqi
women NGOs prepared two reports on the situation of Iraqi women amid conflict. One was a
shadow report that was submitted in the 57th CEDAW session in February 2014 in Geneva. The
other was the Civil Society Monitoring Report for the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The latter
was presented at the commemoration of the 14th anniversary of the resolution in New York. The
two reports assessed the status of women in Iraq, particularly at the level of political participation,
violence against women, trafficking in women and prostitution and personal and marital status. In
both reports, policies and legislations taken (and untaken) to promote the status of women were
critically assessed to reveal the major weaknesses in governmental systems and societal practices.
In addition, the Iraqi women organized a series of national and international conferences
that demonstrated their resilience to violence, militant acts, terrorism and the deteriorating security
conditions. In May 2015, the Iraqi Women’s organizations prepared the Regional Women's
Security Forum on UNSCR 1325 for the Middle East and North Africa in Erbil under the title
"Women's Resistance to Extremism, Terrorism and their Struggle for their Rights and for Peace
and Security.” The forum presented vivid testimonies of women who suffered sexual violence after
an invasion that urged the city of Mosul, especially the Yazidi women. The forum did not only
present testimonies of victim women, but also the testimonies of courageous women who resisted
violence, terrorism and extremism. At the end of the forum, the "Erbil Declaration" was issued. It
stressed the importance of solidarity among women in the face of militancy, terrorism and religious
5

The organizations are: Women Empowerment Organization, the Women's Freedom Organization, the Iraqi
Women's Association, the Assyrian Women's Union, Baghdad Women's Association, Iraqi Hope Association and
ASODA.
6
The UNSCR 1325, adopted in 2000, emphasizes “the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of
conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict
reconstruction” (OSAGI, 2005).
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extremism. The declaration also emphasized the need to engage women in peace-building,
resolving disputes, participating in negotiations, promoting a culture of nonviolence and in
rejecting extremism and discrimination. In the interview with Kabashi, the latter pointed out that,
We, ‘women’s organizations’, stressed in the Erbil Declaration on the need to
provide full protection for survivors of violence and their rehabilitation and
integration into society through governmental and community action as per the
general recommendation No. 30 mentioned in the concluding recommendation No.
14 of the CEDAW report on Iraq.
In the same year, the Iraqi women NGOs, in cooperation with the United Nations Mission
in Iraq Gender Unit, organized a national conference on "Empowering women to counter the
impact of terrorism.” The national conference is considered a follow up to the Regional Women's
Security Forum. It discussed the emergency plan which the Iraqi government adopted for the
implementation of UNSCR 1325 while focusing on the protection of displaced and refugee women
and promoting the need to engage women in conflict resolution, negotiations and peace-building.

Palestinian Women in the Face of Israeli State Oppression
Public activism among Palestinian women dates back to the mid-twentieth century and the
establishment of the Israeli state. The nature of this activism has varied, including protests and
demonstrations, communicating with the media, and seeking military training in West Bank and
Gaza (Ebel, 2012). In the 1960s and 1970s, several women’s organizations, such as the General
Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) and the Union of Palestinian Women’s Working
Committee, were established for both nationalist and gender-equality purposes. They did not only
provide direct services to fellow women, but they also emphasized the importance of women’s
role in liberating the homeland (Devroe, 2009; Ebel, 2012). The start of the first Intifada in 1987
stimulated waves of mass participation even among citizens who were, formerly, politically nonactive and, hence, marked the start of a popular struggle against the occupying forces (Ryan, 2013).
Palestinian women from different ages and classes took part in popular struggle through civil
disobedience as well as by boycotting Israeli products (Jad, 1999). In an interview with Abla Al
Dajani, the head of the GUPW, the latter highlighted that women managed to produce their daily
needs inside their homes. They also created ‘women cooperatives’ to support the national
production process. In addition, they participated in throwing stones, burning tires, building road
blocks, delivering social relief funds to the Palestinian families under curfew and replacing men,
killed or under detention, in some formerly male-dominated occupations.
After the end of the Intifada, the Palestinian women continued to resist the Israeli presence and
practices. It is crucial, however, to ‘contextualize’ the experience of the Palestinian women within
the general framework of oppression within which they live. Palestinian women are subjected to
different forms of exclusion and oppression. Around 76 percent of the Palestinian adults and 83.4
percent of the Palestinian children in East Jerusalem live below the poverty line, compared to
average poverty rates of 21.7 percent and 30 percent among the same groups in Israel (The
Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 2017).
Particular women’s groups, such as elderly women, those with disabilities or femaleheaded households, are exposed to greater marginalization than other women groups in Palestine.
Elderly women, for example, are more vulnerable to poverty and disease due to their lower levels
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of education and restricted access to services, income and all kinds of resources compared to
elderly men and the rest of the Palestinian population (The Non-Governmental Women Coalition
for the Implementation of CEDAW in the Occupied State of Palestine, 2017). Similarly, the 2019
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) Report on the Social and Economic
Situation of Palestinian Women and Girls notes that “women and girls with disabilities encounter
an additional range of challenges in reporting on violence and accessing justice, due to their
heightened vulnerability resulting from their impaired ability to report crimes as well as the
stigmatization of disability and/or their inaccessibility to protection services.” According to the
World Food Programme (WFP), the prevalence of food insecurity among female-headed
households, which make up around 11 percent of Palestinian households, is 15 percentage points
higher than male-headed households (WFP, 2017). As is clear from the recent murder of the 21
years old Israa Gharib by her family members, violence against women remains widespread among
Palestinian families. In the period from 2016-2017, more than 22,200 cases of violence against
Palestinian women were recorded (OCHA, 2017). Given Palestinian women’s traditional
reluctance to report violence, particularly when practiced by family members, the actual
prevalence of violence against women is likely to even be higher than the number of cases reported
(ESCWA, 2019).
The socio-economic situation of Palestinian women has been worsened and to some extent
created by the Israeli occupation. Using state institutions, such as the government, media,
education and criminal justice system, the Israeli occupation continues to expose the Palestinian
women to systematic and organized sexual violence, ill treatment in prisons and restriction of
movement. Since El-Nakba or “the Catastrophe” of 1948 and the ensuing genocide in Der Yassin,
sexual violence against Palestinian women has been practiced by Israelis as a systematic warfare
strategy (Ihmoud, 2015). According to the UNHCR, “women are regularly exposed to threats
whenever they pass military checkpoints. They are forced to strip in front of their families and they
occasionally fall prey to sexual violence by the Israeli soldiers.” For example, Palestinian female
students are forced to strip naked during inspections, particularly at Bethlehem checkpoint; and
many students are forced to remove their veils and even their clothes for alleged reasons of security
(Ghazalah, 2007). The raping of female relatives of Palestinian prisoners was even recommended
by some Israeli academic scholars in Israeli public universities, such as Mordechai Kedar from
Ban Ilan University, as a deterrence strategy to intimidate Palestinians from committing ‘terrorist’
attacks (Kashti, 2014). Some Israeli politicians, including members of the Israeli Knesset, such as
Ayelet Shaked, support the killing of Palestinian women whom they believe compromise the
security and very existence of the Israeli state (Abunimah, 2014). The endorsement of such violent
practices by the state invokes various reactions among the Palestinian population, particularly
women (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Ihmoud & Nashif, 2014).
Furthermore, the Israeli state apparatus continued to oppress Palestinian women through
its legal and criminal justice system. Israeli forces have arrested more than 10,000 Palestinian
women since 1967. In 2015, more than 106 Palestinian women were arrested, which is 60 percent
higher than the number of Palestinian women arrested in 2014 and 70 percent higher than the
number of the arrested in 2013 (Al-Dameer Association, 2016). During detention, Palestinian
women are exposed to systematic physical violence during and after interrogations. Interrogators
and guards in the Palestinian women’s prisons are often males, a practice which increases the risk
of women’s exposure to sexual violence and violates article 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
(Jaffer, 2011). They are also deprived of sleep, denied toilet facilities in prisons and yards, and
forced to live in unhygienic conditions (bhais, Itani and Salahat, 2010; Jaffer, 2011).
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In addition to sexual violence and ill treatment in the prisons and detentions, the Israeli
forces deny Palestinian women their right to freedom of movement. As a result, these women do
not enjoy access to medical care and health services. In some occasions, pregnant Palestinian
women have to give birth on the ground by the checkpoints with no medical services provided.
Ambulances are either prevented from reaching certain places or forbidden from passing
checkpoints (Amnesty International, 2005). Furthermore, Israeli forces prohibited women, for
instance in Al Khalayleh and Azzun Almeh, from obtaining their daily necessities. Public
transportation is also denied, which increases the isolation of Palestinians and increases the
burdens placed upon Palestinian women to obtain daily necessities (Women’s Centre for Legal
Aid and Counselling, 2010). Eventually, the increased blockades, checkpoints and curfew
negatively influence the rate of female enrollment in schools and universities, especially with the
increasing risk of the Palestinian girls and women being exposed to sexual violence (Dana and
Walker, 2015).
Whereas some women experience feelings of powerlessness to defend themselves in
detention or at check points and some families force their daughters to quit education, some
Palestinian women translate these acts of victimization into resistance, peaceful and non-peaceful.
The practices of oppression do not disempower but, rather, empower Palestinian women by
changing the traditional stereotypical roles of Middle Eastern women in mind. Coupled with
nationalist motives, the insecurities faced by Palestinian women contribute to their resistance.
Ultimately, it leads to a rebuttal of the dominant western discourse about women, in general, and
Middle Eastern women, in particular, as victims.
‘Sumud’ is one form of Palestinian women’s peaceful resistance to oppression. For
Palestinian women, Sumud is a means to ‘defy’ and a source of power (Ryan, 2015). While the
main aim of occupation is forcing people to leave their lands, Sumud, on the other hand, reflects
Palestinian women’s insistence on not abandoning their rights, including their right to land (Ryan,
2015). Al Dajani emphasized during the interview that, while she is the head of the GUPW in
Egypt and someone who has the chance to sit with Palestinian leaders, for her, the role of
Palestinian women living under occupation is 100 times her role in the resistance movement.
Sumud is practiced by women through their protection of homes and maintaining a presence in
them and the lands despite the occupation. In addition, Al Dajani observed that, “the Palestinian
women inform their children about the Palestinian cause, culture and identity. Since men are
detained or busy with work, women in Palestine are the ones who preserve the Palestinian identity
by keeping the Palestinian memory alive and passing it on to the upcoming generations.”
In that sense, Sumud involves the normalization of life making it ‘livable’ for Palestinian women
and their families (Johanssona & Vinthagena, 2015). For instance, women organize weddings and
different celebrations, visit their relatives and friends and make group trips, despite the blockades
and the denial of collective gathering (Ibid). During in-depth interviews carried out by Devroe
(2009), none of the Palestinian women interviewed explicitly used the word ‘Sumud. However,
the way in which they described the obstacles they face and their insistence at overcoming them
and their refusal to be isolated are all signs of ‘Sumud.’ The interviewees emphasized that they
have the right to enjoy life through, for example, travelling to the beach, visiting other Palestinian
cities and meeting with relatives (Devroe, 2009). Their acts are symbols of peaceful resistance to
domination and subjection. Through their Sumud, Palestinian women manifest their resistance to
occupation.
To prevent the Israeli forces from eliminating their culture, Palestinian women employ also
strategies of “cultural resistance” (Devroe, 2009). This includes singing folkloric songs, sewing
215
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 21, No. 1 February 2020

and dressing traditional customs, painting ceramics, writing stories, and producing documentaries,
such as “This is not a Living” by Alia Arasoughly or movies, such as “Girls and the sea” by
Taghreed El-Azza and “3000 Nights” directed by May El-Masri; all of which document and
preserve the Palestinian heritage across the generations (Devroe, 2009; Johanssona & Vinthagena,
2015; Ryan, 2015). Such acts of cultural resistance challenge Israeli attempt to dominate the
discourse. Rather, through them, Palestinian women commemorate their own history and produce
their own narratives. According to Siljak (2014), by controlling the narrative of storytelling, the
Israelis seek to reduce the Palestinian identity to themes of terrorism and victimization. On the
other hand, through art, storytelling and narrating their hard realities, Palestinian women present
an alternative local/indigenous discourse about ‘Palestine’ and the ‘Palestinians’ (Rijke and
Teefelen, 2014).
Palestinian women are not only engaged in peaceful acts resistance. The history of
militancy among Palestinian women started following the 1967 defeat. For instance, to demand
the release of a number of Palestinian detainees and to draw international attention, Leila Khaled
hijacked a passenger plane in August 1969 and attempted to hijack another one in 1970. Leila
Khaled explains in an interview that, “the plane hijackings were tactical. Just for a short time,
just to ring a bell for the world and make people ask the question: why?” (Schmitt, 2014). In
March 1978, Dalal El Maghrebi, who was also a leader of a guerrilla group called ‘Deir Yassin’,
hijacked an Israeli Military bus in an operation called “The Coast”. Unlike the first Intifada,
which was characterized primarily by women’s peaceful resistance, some Palestinian women’s
resistance during and after the second Intifada took a different and more violent shape (Johnson,
& Kuttab, 2001). In January 2002, Wafa Idris detonated a bomb outside a busy Israeli show
store, thus becoming the first female Palestinian suicide bomber (Ebel, 2012). After Idris, the
participation of women in suicide bombing operations gained momentum. For example, Dareen
Abu Aisheh carried out a similar a suicidal operation in the same year of Idris action, using an
explosive belt, despite the refusal of Hamas to women’s engagement in suicide bombing
operations. Abu Aisheh not only resisted occupation but resisted the traditional tendency to
confine women to a solely reproductive and ‘maternal’ role (Ryan, 2013).

Kurdish Women of Turkey in the face of State and Society Oppression
To better understand the roles of Kurdish women in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),
it is important to situate these roles within their broad as well as local contexts. By broad context,
we refer to the policies of practiced by the Turkish government. With the local context, we mean
the specific ideological and strategic background and motives of the PKK and the Kurdish
community.
According to Shahrzad Mojab (2000) “the Kurdish case can be distinguished from others
by the brutality of national oppression. The Kurds have been subjected to genocide, ethnic
cleansing, linguicide and ethnocide, i.e., the deliberate killing of their language and culture.” Soon
after the creation of the new Turkish Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal’s government followed
repressive physical and symbolic “assimilation policies” towards the “Kurdish minority” to
assimilate Kurds into the dominant nation (Mojab, 2000; Donmez 2007; Al-Ali and Tas 2017).
Ethnic diversity was seen as a threat to the integrity of the country and its “Turkishness.” Thus,
kurds were declared to be Turks; and their culture was to be Turkish. (Al-Ali and Tas 2017).
Accordingly, the Turkish state banned the terms "Kurd" and "Kurdistan" and the term Kurd was
removed from language and formal documents. Although the prohibition of the “Kurdish
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language” was not applied until 1983 constitution, speaking Kurdish has been banned in the
“southeastern provinces” since 1925 (Mojab, 2000; Donmez 2007; Al-Ali and Tas 2017). For
instance, "mountain Turks," was used to replace “Turks” and the “Southeast” was used instead of
the “Kurdish region”. In the 1990s, the Kurdish activist and Member of Parliament, Leyla Zana,
was sentenced to ten years in prison when she spoke Kurdish while taking the parliamentary oath
(Al-Ali and Tas 2017). In addition, Kurdish farmers who sold their merchandise in urban
marketplaces were also fined for every “Kurdish word” they spoke 7. Also, constraints were placed
on Kurdish costumes and celebrations of traditional holidays; the use of Kurdish language was
also banned in media (Donmez, 2007).
In addition, the Turkish state used its educational system (and other institutions) to ensure
Kurdish assimilation. This led to further repression of the Kurdish population, in general and the
Kurdish women, in particular (Mojab, 2000). According to Westrheim (2008), through the Turkish
nationalist educational system, the Kurdish society is being dispossessed of its “native language
and, thus, is subordinated”. Despite the state’s attempts to teach Turkish in rural areas where ethnic
Kurds dominate, the state minister for south eastern Turkey, Salih Yildirim, stated that half of the
women living in the region still do not speak Turkish (Gökalp 2010). Being unable to speak the
dominant language deprives the Kurdish women of Turkey from available opportunities, including
education, employment in the formal sector and access to the public sphere (Westrheim 2008).
Since language can be perceived as a form of social capital, or as Westrheim (2008) calls it
“linguistic capital”, many Kurdish women missed out on this vital social capital.
In response to being denied their identity, language and education, Kurdish nationalist
feelings have intensified (Çaha, 2011; Al-Ali and Tas, 2017). The Kurdish protests against the
government occurred in 1925, 1930 and 1937. Each time, they were violently quashed by the
Turkish military, which burned houses and used artillery attacks on villages. Thus, from 1938 to
the 1960s, the Kurdish activists were forced towards more underground activism. Against a
background of state oppression, the rise of the PKK took place in late 1970s (Çaha 2011). At this
time, the PKK called to establish a separate “Marxist-Leninist Kurdish” state in southeastern
Turkey where the majority of Turkey’s Kurdish people are concentrated (Tezcür 2010). According
to Eyrice (2013), “from the beginning, the PKK described Kurdistan as an area under colonial rule,
where tribal leaders and a comprador bourgeoisie colluded to help the state exploit the lower
classes.” Thus, the PKK employed an anti-capitalist, anti-feudal, Marxist-Leninist national
liberation discourse to mobilize members of the poor rural Kurdish populations (its peasants,
youths and intellectuals). To the Kurds, armed struggle was necessary for the preservation of
Kurdish identity, which was based on a “traumatic collective identity” in relation to its enemy. The
PKK started a violent insurgence against the Turkish government in 1984. This escalated further
when the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was trapped in Nairobi in early 1999 (Dienel 2010)
To defend their identity against the Kemalist modernization project which marginalized
the Kurds, young women engaged in “political and military operations” conducted by the PKK.
On the one hand, the ethnic identity of Kurdish women in Turkey was dismantled; on the other
hand, their female Turkish counterparts became the major beneficiaries of the Kemalist reforms
aimed at improving women’s civil and political status in Turkey. This resulted in huge economic
and educational gap between Kurdish and non-Kurdish women in Turkey (Yüksel, 2006).
According to Bloom (2012), “the common assumption that women are inherently nonviolent
7

However, there was no official discrimination against those Kurds who agreed to be assimilated: they could reach
the highest positions in the state apparatus. Those who refused, however, often met with severe repression (Donmez
2007).
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remains fixed in people’s minds. Even when women are implicated in violence, there is a tendency
to assume that they are merely the pawns of men.” However, in their interviews with female
members of the PKK, Al-Ali and Tas (2017) and Wood and Thoma (2017) find a common
agreement that the systematic and continuous repression of the Turkish state to the Kurds
contributed to the growth of the PKK and its popularity among Kurdish young men and women.
For example, Zeynep, a soldier in the PKK, explained her motivation to join the PKK in terms of
nationalism: “I care very much about the interests of the Kurdish nation and for this I fight. I mean
I fight not only for Kurdish women but also for Kurdish people. As a Kurdish woman, I perceive
as my duty the fight against the ones who deny its existence” (Wood and Thomas, 2017).
Additional factors led to the radicalization and militarization of women’s roles in the PKK.
In some provinces, f instance Diyarbakir, the displacement process was reinforced over the last
decades due to the struggle between PKK and Turkish forces. Morgenstern (2009) claimed that,
from the 1980s to the 1990s, Turkish forces occupied large areas of the conventionally Kurdishinhabited lands, utilizing extensive methods to defeat any insurgence movement, including
killings, mass arrests, torture and the rape of many women. An estimated 35,000 Kurdish people
were killed by Turkish forces at this time (Morgenstern, 2009). By 2016, the number grew to
50,000 deaths and 100,000 missing (Al-Ali and Tas 2017). Turkish forces destroyed and evacuated
2664 villages in southeastern Turkey which led to several internal social and economic problems
(Morgenstern, 2009). In analyzing the impact of such practices on women, Al-Ali and Tas (2017)
found that young Kurdish women -and men- became “fearless as a result of their experiences
during the 1990s, a period of prolonged acute conflict, widespread violence and large-scale
displacement.” In addition, since many Kurdish women have lost their male breadwinners as a
result of being detained, recruited in the PKK, or killed by the Turkish forces, the roles of Kurdish
women in their families have been transformed. Kurdish women became the key source of income
to their families and played a major role in terms of agricultural production for the ‘household
economy.’ The loss of their lands due to displacement resulted in women’s loss of their position
as “providers for the household which increased the burdens placed upon them” (Bloom, 2005).
This experience contributed to the radicalization of the Kurdish women. It also exacerbated their
tendency to think that the only way to protect themselves and preserve their identity is through
violence. It also led to the increasing acceptance of the PKK in Kurdish areas among women and
local people. For example, in the video directed by Mukan (2014), Salan, a solider in the PKK,
states that, “I went to the mountains to get the required education and for training to fight against
our enemy.” Zelal, another fighter in the PKK, states that “in the southeast region, the resistance
has never stopped because of the massacres and displacement and the pain that was caused to our
people, thus, we grow up for the resistance to protect our identity and to bring peace to our people”
(Çaha, 2011). The video reflects the experience of Kurdish women living in conflict zones. It also
shows how the discourse of “us versus them” has increased among the women leading them to
want to join the PKK.
The increasing recruitment of Kurdish women in the PKK is grounded in three main
factors: the PKK’s pursuit for democracy and women’s rights; the Kurdish women’s search for
gender equality; and the PKK’s attempt to improve its strategic capabilities. On the one hand,
Kurdish leader, Abdullah Öcalan asserted that women’s enslavement is the main factor that
prevents social freedom. He supported women’s emancipation and gender equality as the only way
to achieve democratic change. According to Öcalan, “the freedom of a nation depends on the
freedom of its woman” (Düzgün, 2016). Hence, since the establishment of the PKK, women have
been recruited within the “Marxist-Leninist rhetoric” as well as the rhetoric of ethnic nationalism.
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Öcalan suggested that “women's organizations create separate branches to promote rights and
equality within the wider movement and society. Öcalan created these branches within society,
political parties and guerrilla movements” (Gonzalez-Perez 2008).
On the other hand, Gonzalez-Perez (2008) argues that the “traditional feudal values” which are
dominant in the Kurdish society reinforce the male-dominant values which made woman
powerless. Thus, Kurdish males occupy more superior positions within the family and society
while women are responsible of doing all of the domestic work and bringing up children, even
when they succeed in gaining employment outside the household. Therefore, women’s enrollment
in the PKK can be seen as a way to avoid family subjugation and gain more ‘gender equality’
within the PKK, which seemed to embrace more democratic values. In their interviews with female
members in the PKK, Al-Ali and Tas (2017) found that young women do not only perceive the
PKK as a political movement, but also as a means for their emancipation and for achieving more
egalitarian gender relations. According to Bouta, Frerks and Bannon (2004), traditional relations
between women and men tend to change in conflict times and military towards more equal gender
relations compared to outside the military or pre-conflict. As one of the female fighters of the PKK
put it, “I am now a free woman, brave and able to defend myself and my people. I fight for the
enslaved woman, help their liberation from oppression” (Smits and Gündüz-Hoşgör, 2010).
According to Yüksel (2006), these women struggle for both their women’s rights and their identity.
It is, therefore, necessary to recognize the common ground between Kurdish women’s fight for
their feminine and national identities. For Kurdish women, the “oppressed nation” and the
“oppressed gender” are both correlated and are viewed as equal to each other. The conjunction of
these two types of oppression constitutes the Kurdish feminist identity (Yüksel, 2006).
Since the establishment of the PKK, it purposefully recruited Kurdish women in order to
improve its strategic capabilities (Cragin and Daly, 2009). In an interview conducted with the
expert, Mohamed Gomaa’, he explained that “the PKK highly depends on women in suicide
bombing missions due to that fact that women are less suspicious and they are less visible to
inspection by security than men.” According to Bloom (2005), “on 30 June 1996, the first women
suicide bomber associated with the PKK in Turkey killed six soldiers and wounded an additional
thirty through a suicide bombing belt strapped to her stomach and built in such a way to suggest
that she was pregnant.” As a result, eleven of the fifteen suicide bombings of the PKK between
1996 and 1999 were conducted by women (Sutten, 2009). In 2004, the PKK had around 5,000
fighters with 1,100 women functioning as suicide bombers. If this shows anything, it shows the
high degree the PKK relied on women as “suicide bombers” (Bloom, 2005). Most importantly, the
high prevalence of women within the PKK militaries contests the traditional image of militant acts
as profoundly male dominated while women, when present, are merely victims.
In the PKK, Kurdish women did not only play important roles as logisticians, guerrilla
fighters and suicide bombers, they also participated heavily in the leadership and decision-making.
In the initial days of their struggle, Kurdish women in the PKK functioned mainly in cleaning the
camps, cooking and transmitting communication. However, with the intensification of the Kurdish
insurgence in the 1980s, the roles of Kurdish women in the PKK quickly moved into more strategic
roles (Gonzalez-Perez, 2008). For instance, in the late 1990s, two of the PKK supporters in the
Kurdish Diaspora, Hanan Ahmed Osman and Zehra Saygili, fundraised and facilitated the transfer
of money to the PKK, as a part of the ‘Kurdish Cultural Association in Montreal’ (Ibid). In
addition, with time, Kurdish women increasingly participated as leaders and decision-makers in
the PKK. The PKK established a quota of 40 percent for women in the leadership council (Gökalp,
2010). The Kurdish women also played the role of “strategic visionaries”. Strategic visionaries are
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individuals or senior leaders within a terrorist group who prepare strategies and publish pamphlets
and other documents that outline the PKK’s worldview and direction (Cragin and Daly 2009).
According to Cragin and Daly (2009), Kesire Yildirim was a founding member of the PKK
and wife of its leader. She became a believer in both the Kurdish nationalist movement and an
adherent to the Marxist–Leninist ideology. Hence, as the primary and only female member of the
PKK’s dominant committee in 1978, Kesire Yildirim is recognized by most for inserting feminist
ideals into the PKK’s strategic direction. Under her leadership, the PKK became a group that
struggled to offer better chances for Kurdish rural females in Turkey (Cragin and Daly 2009). In
1999, for the first time, three Kurdish women were chosen as local mayors. This number increased
in 2004 by 14 women mayors (Yüksel, 2006). In the 2007 elections, 8 out of 21 Kurdish members
of the national Parliament being females. The Kurdish women’s representation was 38 percent
compared to only 9 percent women’s representation in the parliament of the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP). The percentage of Kurdish women’s representation increased by the
2015 elections reaching 40 percent compared to only 16 percent women’s representation in the
AKP (Erel and Acik, 2019). This reflects some signs of change in Turkey’s patriarchal culture
towards, arguably, more ‘gender equality.’ Such signs are the product of a long political struggle
of the Kurdish women’s movement, which has continuously challenged men’s political leadership
in the PKK (Al-Ali and Tas, 2017).

Concluding Remarks
The portrayal of Middle Eastern women as either victims or heroines confines our
understanding of the real life for these women (Bibars, 2001; Al-Ali and Pratt, 2006). The reality
is, of course, much more complex. Delimiting the experience of Middle Eastern women to the
victimization discourse or the stereotyped roles of women depicts an incomplete and inaccurate
picture of the roles women play in reality and de-contextualizes their experience. The oppression
inflicted upon Iraqi, Palestinian and Kurdish women does not only victimize them, it also spurs
their resistance. In this sense, victimization and resistance resemble two sides of the same coin.
Allowing them to complete rather than compete enables us to piece together a more layered and
nuanced portrait of women’s realities. Considering both discourses simultaneously reveals the
consequences of the oppression women endure and the true scope of their responses. According to
Sedghi (1994), there is a multiplicity of Third World women responses. Such responses are
specific to time and place and demonstrate an ongoing struggle against the domination and
oppression exercised upon them not only by gender, but also by class, race and state.
These responses are shaped by external and internal factors –including gender relationswhich restrain women and/or open windows of opportunities to them. Iraqi women suffer because
of the staggering amount of violence around them and the failure the state to provide security,
services and adequate humanitarian assistance and lack of political will to combat the violence and
improve their overall conditions. However, while Iraqi women, for example, were able to take
advantage of the window of opportunity opened in front of them after the fall of the Ba‘th regime
due national and international circumstances, others were not. As O'Connell (2011) states, “a new
post-conflict political settlement, constitution and political regime, may provide opportunities to
enshrine the principles and promote the practices of gender equality and women’s rights and
empowerment in social, economic and political arena.” As a result, more than Palestinian and
Kurdish women, Iraqi activists in ‘post’ invasion Iraq, managed to take advantage of writing a new
constitution and the international support for women’s rights to establish a quota for women
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(Efrati, 2012). As emphasized by Cynthia Enloe (2010), in their struggle for quota, Iraqi activists
drew on the pressure by many international women and human rights’ organizations to introduce
gender quotas and increase women’s political representation during the 1990s and the early 2000s.
In addition, they managed to take advantage of the newly acquired rights and freedoms, such as
the freedom of association as well as the support and fund made available by the United States
agencies, such as United States Institute for Peace, the National Endowment for Democracy and
the Research Triangle Institute and ‘Women’s Democracy Initiative’ (Al-Ali and Pratt, 2008). This
is not to suggest that these Iraqi organizations are affiliated to the U.S (Ibid). Rather, it is to observe
that the Iraqi women organizations and activists do not operate in a context characterized majorly
by international opposition and lack of support, such as Palestinian and Kurdish women. As a
result, the Iraqi women engaged in what Dudouet (2015) classifies as conventional actions
(including party politics, advocacy, dialogue and negotiations and litigation) more than contentious
armed or unarmed actions taking advantage of the national and international windows of
opportunity.
Palestinian women, by contrast, lack international support. In her interviews with
Palestinian women, Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2010) finds a constant use of phrases such as, “No one
sees us or hear us,” and “we are not considered human beings”. In this sense, the Palestinian
women’s resistance operates within a context dominated by ‘politics of invisibility’, which
deliberately attempts to make the Palestinian cause and the Palestinians’ suffering invisible. Yet,
in response to the Israeli use of ‘invisibility’ as a deliberate strategy to isolate the Palestinians,
Palestinian women express their resilience through Sumud and strategies of cultural resistance.
Their response is marked by uniqueness or being ‘non-conventional’ in Dudouet’s terms in a way
that matches the exceptionality of their experience and the oppression they endure.
In sum, the responses of Iraqi, Palestinian and Kurdish women (and of Middle Eastern
women at large), can be best seen in the form of a continuum of responses characterized by
multiplicity, dynamism and interaction. When met with severe oppression or colonial and imperial
domination, Iraqi, Palestinian and Kurdish women at different points of times resorted also to nonpeaceful resistance. Iraqi women have once resorted to non-peaceful means of resistance against
the British colonization and the Yazidi women continue to lift up arms against ISIS to liberate their
lands and defend their countries. Palestinian women, on the other hand, engage in militant actions
to express their resistance to the oppressive institutions of occupation and their policies of violence
against their ‘body, home and homeland.’ Indeed, the continuum of responses manifests itself most
clearly in the Palestinian case where women use both Sumud and cultural resistance on and forth
along with violent resistance. At last, the Kurdish women resisted the oppression and the repressive
and violent policies of the Turkish state by becoming active fighters and holding leadership
positions in the PKK.
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